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Abstract 
This paper considers the properties of an optimal monetary policy when households 
are subject to counter-cyclical uninsured i n c o m e  s h o c k s .  W e  develop a tractable 
incomplete-markets model with Calvo price setting. In our model the welfare cost of 
business cycles is large when the variance of income shocks is counter-cyclical. 
Nevertheless, the optimal monetary policy is very similar to the optimal policy that 
emerges in the representative agent framework and calls for nearly complete 
stabilization of the price-level. 
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Recent empirical studies have found that individuals face highly persistent idiosyncratic income
shocks and that the variance of these shocks is countercyclical (Storesletten, Telmer, Yaron,
2004; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004). If asset markets are incomplete and these income shock are
not insurable, then the welfare cost of business cycles can be very large as shown, for instance,
by Krebs (2003) and De Santis (2007). In this paper, we investigate how monetary policy
should be conducted in the presence of persistent and countercyclical idiosyncratic risk.
We consider a New Keynesian model with Calvo-style price rigidity, augmented with unin-
sured idiosyncratic income shocks.1 As shown, for instance, by Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007),
the optimal monetary policy obtained in the standard New Keynesian model calls for (nearly)
complete ination stabilization. That is, in the context of the classical trade-o between in-
ation and output uctuations, the monetary authority should almost exclusively focus on the
stabilization of ination. This result, however, is produced in the representative-agent frame-
work, in which the welfare cost of business cycles is negligible, as is originally shown by Lucas
(1987). Our model with persistent and countercyclical idiosyncratic risk yields a sizable cost of
business cycles, and it is interesting to see how this alters the trade-o between ination and
output stabilization.
Our model builds on the exchange economy studied by Constantinides and Due (1996)
and extends it to a production economy with endogenous labor supply. We assume that the
labor productivity of each individual follows a geometric random walk, and there are no insur-
ance markets for that risk. Assuming such idiosyncratic shocks would in general require that
the wealth distribution, an innite-dimensional object, be included as a state variable, which
causes a \curse of dimensionality" problem. In order to maintain tractability, we assume that
the return to savings of each individual is also subject to idiosyncratic risk. Under these as-
sumptions we can show that the no-trade theorem of Constantinides and Due (1996) extends
to a production economy with endogenous labor supply.2
We also demonstrate that there exists a representative-agent economy with preference shocks
that yields the same aggregate quantities and prices in equilibrium as the original heterogeneous-
agents economy with incomplete markets.3 We show that an increase in the variance of idiosyn-
cratic income shocks in our incomplete-markets economy has the same eect as an increase
(resp. decrease) in the discount factor in the corresponding representative-agent economy if the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption is less (resp. greater) than unity.
We then embed this incomplete-markets model into an otherwise standard New Keynesian
model with monopolistic competition and the Calvo price setting. Calvo price setting makes
1There is large literature on New Keynesian models. Useful overviews are provided by, for instance, Woodford
(2003) and Gal  (2008).
2Papers that apply the no-trade result of Constantinides and Due (1996) include, among others, Saito
(1998), Krebs (2003, 2007), De Santis (2007). Angeletos (2007) considers a model with idiosyncratic shocks to
the return to individual savings. None of these consider endogenous labor-leisure decision.
3For a general discussion on the correspondence between incomplete-markets economies and representative-
agent economies, see Nakajima (2005).
2prot maximization of each rm an intertemporal problem. When the nancial markets are
incomplete, shareholders, in general, do not agree on how to value future dividends.4 In the
context of the Calvo model, this would imply that when a rm obtains an opportunity to adjust
the price of its product, its shareholders do not agree upon what price it should charge. For-
tunately, however, under our assumptions, we establish that there is no disagreement problem
and that all shareholders value future dividends in the same way.
We consider two kinds of aggregate shocks: a shock to the level of aggregate productivity
and a shock to the variance of idiosyncratic income shocks. We are particularly interested in
the case where the variance of idiosyncratic shocks is negatively correlated with the shock to the
aggregate productivity level, so that idiosyncratic risk is countercyclical. For the productivity
shock process, we consider two laws of motion, a geometric random walk, and a stationary,
autoregressive process. We start by showing that the welfare cost of business cycles can be
large in our economy. Consistent with the previous nding on the exchange economy (De
Santis, 2007), with countercyclical idiosyncratic risk, the welfare cost of business cycles can
be sizable (around 10% permanent decline in consumption) with a reasonable coecient of
relative risk aversion, regardless of whether the aggregate productivity shock is permanent or
temporary.
We then use our model to answer the following question. How does such a large welfare cost
of business cycles aect the trade-o between output and ination stabilization? To examine
this question, we compare two policy regimes: the Ramsey regime and the ination-targeting
regime. In the Ramsey regime, the monetary authority sets (with commitment) the state-
contingent path of the ination rate so as to maximize the average utility level. In the ination-
targeting regime, the monetary authority sets the ination rate at zero at all times. Schmitt-
Groh e and Uribe (2007) show in a representative-agent economy that the equilibrium obtained
under the Ramsey regime is nearly identical to the equilibrium obtained under the ination-
targeting regime. Thus, the question here is how much the equilibria under these two policy
regimes would dier in the presence of countercyclical idiosyncratic risk. We nd that a similar
result arises in our model. Optimal monetary policy is essentially given by complete price
stabilization even with countercyclical idiosyncratic risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our heterogeneous-
agents economy with incomplete markets, and then construct a corresponding representative-
agent economy which yields the same equilibrium as the original economy. In Section 3, we
present our numerical results. In Section 4, we conclude.
2 The model economy
In this section we describe our model economy. It is a version of the neoclassical growth
model with uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks studied in Braun and Nakajima (2008),
augmented with monopolistic competition and nominal price rigidities as in Calvo (1983). For
4For the overview on the theory of incomplete markets, see, for instance, Magill and Quinzii (1996).
3simplicity we consider a cashless economy as in Woodford (2003).
2.1 Individuals
The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals of unit measure, indexed by i 2 [0;1].
They are subject to both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. We assume that idiosyncratic
shocks are independent across individuals, and a law of large numbers applies. All individuals
are assumed to be identical ex ante, that is, prior to period 0.
Individuals consume and invest a composite good, which is produced by a continuum of
dierentiated products, indexed by j 2 [0;1]. If the supply of each variety is given by Yj;t, for












where  > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution across dierent varieties. This composite
good is used for consumption and investment:
Yt = Ct + It (2)
where Ct and It denote the aggregate amounts of consumption and investment in period t,
respectively. Let Pj;t denote the price of variety j in period t. It then follows from cost

















Preferences of each individual are described by the utility function dened over stochastic











where  is a subjective discount factor, ci;t is individual i's amount of consumption of the
composite good in period t, and li;t is her labor supply in period t. We use Ei
t to denote the
expectation operator conditional on the history of idiosyncratic shocks to individual i up to and
including period t as well as the history of aggregate shocks over the same time period. The
expectation operator conditional on the history of aggregate shocks up to and including period
t is denoted by Et. For later reference, we dene c as
c  1   (1   ) (6)
4Thus, 1=c is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption with a constant level
of leisure.
The idiosyncratic risk faced by individual i is represented by a geometric random walk fi;tg:





where ;i;t is N(0;1) and i.i.d. across individuals and over time. The standard deviation,
;t, is allowed to uctuate over time, in a way whose evolution is specied below. All agents
are assumed to start with the same initial realization of , i.e., i; 1 =  1, for all i. The
process fi;tg aects individual i's income in two ways. First, i;t represents the productivity
of individual i's labor (her eciency units of labor). Thus, if wt is the real wage rate per
eciency unit of labor, the labor income of individual i in period t is given by wti;tli;t. If the
idiosyncratic risk only aects individuals' labor income, then the distribution of wealth would
have to be included in the vector of aggregate state variables, which would make the numerical
evaluation of optimal monetary policy very costly to undertake. We circumvent this problem
in the following way. Following Braun and Nakajima (2008), we assume that the rate of return
to individuals' savings is also subject to idiosyncratic risk, i;t.
Suppose that claims to the ownership of physical capital and the ownership of rms are
traded separately. We abstract from government bonds. Let qj;t be the period-t price of a share
in rm j 2 [0;1], and ei;j;t be the share in rm j held by individual i at the end of period t.
Below we look for an equilibrium in which all individuals choose the same portfolio weights,
and hence they hold equal shares of all rms, that is, ei;j;t = ei;t for all j 2 [0;1]. Let si;t
be the value of stocks held by individual i: si;t 
R 1
0 qj;tei;j;t dj = ei;t
R 1
0 qj;t dj, and let Rs;t
be the gross rate of return on equities: Rs;t 
R 1
0 (qj;t + dj;t)dj=
R 1
0 qj;t 1 dj. Then, without
idiosyncratic shocks to the return on savings, the ow budget constraint for each individual
would be given by
ci;t + ki;t + si;t = Rk;tki;t 1 + Rs;tsi;t 1 + i;twtli;t
where ki;t is the amount of physical capital obtained by individual i in period t, and Rk;t is the
gross rate of return on physical capital, that is,
Rk;t = 1    + rk;t (8)
where rk;t is the rental rate of capital and  is its depreciation rate. Instead we will assume that
the return to savings is also subject to the idiosyncratic risk, so that the ow budget constraint
becomes
ci;t + ki;t + si;t =
i;t
i;t 1
(Rk;tki;t 1 + Rs;tsi;t 1) + i;twtli;t (9)
Since individuals are identical ex ante,
ki; 1 = K 1; and si; 1 = S 1 (10)
5for all i 2 [0;1]. To rule out Ponzi schemes, we impose ki;t  0 and si;t  0. These last two
constraints will not bind in equilibrium.
In equation (9), i;t=i;t 1 is an idiosyncratic shock to the return on savings. This assump-
tion is purely a technical requirement that makes it possible for us to extend the result obtained
by Constantinides and Due (1996) in an exchange economy to our production economy. Under
this assumption \permanent income" of individual i, which is dened as the sum of human and
nancial wealth, is proportional to i;t. Under our assumption shocks to i;t magnify the eect
of idiosyncratic risk on wealth as compared to the specication where they aect labor income
only. As we shall see below, however, our main nding is that the presence of idiosyncratic
shocks does not matter much for the conduct of monetary policy. Therefore, this feature of our
model strengthens our conclusions.
At date 0, each individual chooses a contingent plan fci;t;li;t;ki;t;si;tg so as to maximize her
utility (5) subject to the sequence of ow budget constraints (9) and the short-selling constraint















(Rk;tki;t 1 + Rs;tsi;t 1) + i;twtli;t   ci;t   ki;t   si;t
)
Then the rst-order conditions are
c
 c





















0ti;tki;t = 0 (15)
lim
t!1Ei
0ti;tsi;t = 0 (16)
Given a vector stochastic process fRk;t;Rs;t;wtg, a solution to the utility maximization problem
of each individual is a state-contingent plan fci;t;li;t;ki;t;si;t;i;tg that satises the rst-order
conditions (9)-(14), as well as the transversality conditions (15)-(16) and the initial conditions
(10).
2.2 Aggregation
Here we show that the utility maximization problem of heterogeneous agents under incomplete
markets described in the previous subsection can be aggregated into a utility maximization
6problem of a representative agent. The key is to allow for stochastic shocks to the utility
function of the representative individual as in Nakajima (2005).









t (1   Lt)1 1 
(17)
where Ct is the amount of consumption of the composite good dened in (1) in period t, and L
is the amount of labor supply in period t. Here, t is the preference shock to the representative












where c is dened in (6), and ;t is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shocks in






where Et denotes the expectation operator conditional on the history of aggregate shocks up
to and including period t.
Suppose that the representative agent faces the following ow budget constraint:
Ct + Kt + St = Rk;tKt 1 + Rs;tSt 1 + wtLt (19)
and initial conditions K 1;S 1 > 0. Here Kt and St are the amount of physical capital and
the value of stocks held by the representative agent in period t. We assume the short-selling
constraints: Kt;St  0. These two constraints do not bind in equilibrium. Given prices and
the initial condition, the representative agent chooses a contingent plan fCt;Lt;Kt;Stg so as
to maximizes the lifetime utility U0 in (17) subject to the sequence of ow budget constraints










t (1   Lt)1 1 
+ t [Rk;tKt 1 + Rs;tSt 1 + wtLt   Ct   Kt   St]

The rst-order conditions are given by
C
 c














7and the ow budget constraint (19). The transversality condition for Kt and St are, respectively,
E0tttKt = 0 (24)
E0tttSt = 0 (25)
Given the initial conditions K 1 and S 1, a solution to the utility maximization problem of
the representative agent is given by fCt;Lt;Kt;St;tg that satises the rst-order conditions
(19)-(23), as well as the transversality conditions (24)-(25). The next proposition establishes
the relationship between the solution to the utility maximization problem of the representative
agent, and the solution to the utility maximization problem of each individual described in the
previous subsection.
Proposition 1. Given stochastic processes fRk;t;Rs;t;wt;;tg and initial conditions fK 1;S 1g,
consider the utility maximization problem of individual i described in the previous subsection







t=0 is a solution to the representative agent's problem. For



















t=0 is a solution to the problem of individual i.







t=0 is a solution to the representative agent's problem. Then
it satises the rst-order conditions, (19)-(23), as well as the transversality conditions, (24)-(25).













Then it is straightforward to see that these satisfy the rst-order conditions, (9), (11)-(14),
and the transversality conditions, (15)-(16), for the problem of individual i. This complete the
proof.
In what follows we derive the equilibrium conditions for our incomplete-markets economy
using the rst-order conditions for the representative agent, (19)-(23) and the transversality
conditions (24)-(25). Note that in equilibrium the utility of the representative agent (17) equals




































t (1   Lt)(1 )(1 )
= U0
8To see how the size of idiosyncratic shocks, ;t, aects the economy, dene the \eective
discount factor" between periods t and t + 1, ~ t;t+1, as











where the second equality follows from (18). This expression illustrates that the presence of
idiosyncratic shocks (;t > 0) makes the eective discount factor higher if c > 1 and lower
if c < 1. Moreover, cyclical uctuations in the variance of idiosyncratic shocks, 2
;t, induce
cyclical variations in the eective discount factor ~ t;t+1.
A special feature of our economy is that, in spite of market incompleteness, there is agree-
ment among individuals on the present value of future dividends of each rm. To see this, note






















Since ;i;t+1 is i.i.d. across individuals and independent of the stochastic shocks faced by each
rm, all individuals evaluate a given future payo in the same way. In particular, we can use
the stochastic discount factor of the representative agent, t+1t+1=(tt), to value future
dividend streams of rms.
2.3 Firms
The production side of our economy is standard in the New Keynesian literature and similar
to the one considered by Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007). Each dierentiated product is







j;t   t (27)
where zt is the aggregate productivity shock, Kj;t is the physical capital used by rm j in period
t, Lj;t is its labor input, and t is the xed cost of production. The market clearing conditions
for capital and labor are
Z 1
0
Kj;t dj = Kt 1; and
Z 1
0
Lj;t dj = Lt
Here, note that the stock of capital available for the production in period t is Kt 1. The
processes for zt and t are specied in the next subsection.










j;t   t = Yj;t
Let mcj;t be the Lagrange multiplier, which will be interpreted as the marginal cost of produc-
tion of rm j. Then the rst-order conditions read





















and that the marginal cost is identical for all rms:







The rst-order conditions for the cost-minimization problem of rm j can now be rewritten as













Firm j's prot in period t is then given as
Pj;t
Pt
Yj;t   wtLj;t   rtKj;t =
Pj;t
Pt













The price of each variety is adjusted in a sluggish way as in Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). For
each rm, the opportunity to change the price of its product arrives with probability 1    in
each period. This random event occurs independently across rms (it is also independent of all
other stochastic shocks in our economy). Without such an opportunity, a rm must charge the
same price as in the previous period. Suppose that rm j obtains an opportunity to change its




















where st+st+s=(tt) is the stochastic discount factor used to evaluate (real) payos in
period t + s in units of consumption in period t.
All rms with the opportunity to change their prices will choose the same price, so denote































































It is convenient to express x1
t and x2
t in a recursive fashion:
x1













Since all rms that adjust their prices in a given period choose the same new price, ~ Pt,





t 1 + (1   ) ~ P
1 
t
which can be rewritten as
1 = 
 1+
t + (1   )~ p
1 
t (33)




















t   t (34)









The evolution of &t can be written as






The aggregate productivity shock is either permanent or temporary. For the case where the
productivity shock is permanent, we assume that zt is a geometric random walk:





and the xed cost of production, t, grows at the rate :
t = exp(t) (37)
where  and z are constant parameters, and z;t is N(0;1) and i.i.d. across periods. For the
case where the productivity shock is temporary, we assume that zt follows an AR(1) process:





and that the xed cost is constant:
t =  (39)
In both cases, the constant  is calibrated so that the aggregate prot is zero in the non-
stochastic steady state (balanced growth path) with zero ination.
The standard deviation of innovations to individual labor productivity, ;t, is also an ag-
gregate shock. Evidence provided by Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004) and Meghir and
Pistaferri (2004) suggests that it uctuates countercyclically. Krebs (2003) and De Santis
(2007) have found that the welfare cost of business cycles can be sizable with countercyclical
idiosyncratic risk. Following this literature, we allow ;t to covary with the aggregate technol-
ogy shock. Specically, when the evolution of the aggregate productivity is given by (36), we
assume that the variance of idiosyncratic shocks evolves as
2
;t =  2
 + bzz;t (40)
and when zt follows the temporary process given by (38), we assume that
2
;t =  2
 + blnzt (41)
An important dierence between these two specications is that 2
;t is serially correlated in
(41) but not in (40).
2.5 Government
Government policy is very simple in our economy. First we abstract from scal policy: the
government does not consume, and there are no government bonds nor taxes. We assume
that the monetary authority can directly control the ination rate. Thus, monetary policy is
specied as a state contingent path of the ination rate, ftg1
t=0. We consider two regimes for
the monetary policy. The rst regime is \ination targeting," where the monetary authority
sets the ination rate to zero at all times and in all contingencies, that is, t = 1, for all t. The
second regime is \Ramsey," where the monetary authority precommits to the state-contingent
path of the ination rate so as to maximize the average utility of individuals U0 = E0[ui;0].
123 Optimal monetary policy
In this section we analyze how the presence of idiosyncratic shocks aects the properties of the
optimal monetary policy. We are particularly interested in the case where the idiosyncratic
risk, ;t, uctuates countercyclically. We show that even though countercyclical idiosyncratic
risk makes the welfare cost of business cycles sizable, properties of the optimal monetary policy
are little aected by the presence of idiosyncratic shocks. Namely, the optimal monetary policy
is roughly characterized as the zero-ination policy.
3.1 Qualitative result
Let us rst consider a special case where a scal policy eliminates the monopoly distortion at the
zero-ination steady state. Specically, suppose that each monopolist's revenue is subsidized
at a rate , that those subsidies are nanced by lump-sum taxes, Tt, on monopolists, and that














then the monopoly distortion is eliminated at the zero-ination steady state. Let the stochastic
processes for fztg and f2
;tg be given either by (36) and (40), or by (38) and (41), respectively.
Now consider our model with a representative agent whose preferences are given by (17).
When the monopolists' revenue is subsidized at the rate (42), the exible-price equilibrium
is clearly Pareto optimal in such an economy. Then, with sticky prices, the Ramsey optimal
monetary policy is setting t = 0 at all dates under all contingencies, if the economy starts
from the zero-ination steady state.
Now consider our model with heterogeneous agents under incomplete markets. Because of
the market incompleteness, the exible-price equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. Nevertheless,
the Ramsey policy is still given by the zero ination policy, because of Proposition 1. Thus we
have the following result.
Proposition 2. Assume that subsidies to the monopolists are given at the rate  = 1
 1, which
are nanced by lump-sum taxes on the monopolists. Suppose also that the economy is initially
at the zero-ination steady state. Then the solution to the Ramsey problem is given by
t = 1;
at all dates under all contingencies.
133.2 Quantitative result
Now let us turn back to a general case with a monopoly distortion:  = Tt = 0. With the
monopoly distortion, setting the ination rate to zero at all dates is no longer strictly optimal.
The question asked in this subsection is how dierent the optimal monetary policy is from the
zero-ination policy.
The parameter values of our model are calibrated as follows. One period in the model
corresponds to a quarter. The share of capital is  = 0:36, and the depreciation rate is
 = 0:02. These are taken from Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001). The probability of
price adjustment is set to 0.2, i.e.,  = 0:8 and the elasticity of substitution across dierent
varieties of products is  = 5, following Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007). The xed cost of
production,  , is set so that the prot of each rm at the non-stochastic steady state under
optimal monetary policy is zero. The discount factor  is chosen so that the real interest rate
at the non-stochastic steady state is four percent a year. For the preference parameter, we
consider two values for c, 0.7 and 2. For each value of c, another preference parameter  is
set so that the labor supply at the stochastic steady state is one third (then,  is determined
as  = 1   (1   c)=). For the case of permanent productivity shock (36), we follow Boldrin,
Christiano and Fisher (2001) and set  = 0:004, and z = 0:018. For the case of temporary
productivity shock (38), we follow Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007)5 and set z = 0:8556 and
z = 0:0064=(1   ). For the idiosyncratic shock process, we follow De Santis (2007) and set
  = 0:1=2 and b = 0 or b =  0:8. As it turns out, as long as we adjust  so as to make the
steady state interest rate equals to a xed rate (i.e., four percent a year), the value of  does
not matter. When b = 0, the idiosyncratic risk is acyclical; when b =  0:8, it is countercyclical.
De Santis (2007) chooses b =  0:8 based on the evidence provided by Storesletten, Telmer and
Yaron (2004).
In what follows, we compare dynamics of dierent versions of our model economy, which
dier in terms of the risk aversion parameter, c 2 f0:7;2g; the cyclicality of the idiosyncratic
risk, b 2 f0; 0:8g; the persistence of the aggregate productivity shock, (36) and (38); or the
policy regime, the Ramsey and the ination-targeting regimes. In addition, for each values of
c and b, and for each process for zt, we compute two normative measures.
The rst one is the welfare cost of business cycles as originally estimated by Lucas (1987).
Specically, we consider the real-business-cycle version of our model, in which there are no
nominal rigidities, and compare the economy with positive aggregate shocks, z > 0, and the
economy without aggregate shocks, z = 0. In both cases we assume that there are idiosyncratic
shocks,   > 0. We also assume that both economies are at the non-stochastic steady state
prior to date 0 and compare the welfare conditional on the state vector at t =  1.6 Let Xt
denote the vector of the state variables, and let  X denote its value at the non-stochastic steady
5Note that the productivity level zt in Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007) corresponds to our z1 
t , so that
their standard deviation must be adjusted by 1=(1   ).
6In this sense, our welfare cost measures are the conditional welfare cost, as opposed to the unconditional
one. Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007) discuss a related issue.
14state. Further, let fCrbc
t ;Lrbc
t g denote the equilibrium process of aggregate consumption and
labor supply in the RBC version of our economy, and let f  C;  Lg denote their values in the
steady state. Then, dene the lifetime utility evaluated at period t =  1 by








t )(1   Lrbc
t )1 1 
where t is given by (18). The corresponding value for the non-stochastic economy is given by







(  C)(1    L)1 1 
where  t is dened by




c(c   1) 2
t








((1   bc)  C)(1    L)1 1 
= V (  X;z;rbc)
that is,
bc = 1  

V (  X;z;rbc)
V (  X;0;rbc)
 1
1 c
The second normative measure is the cost of adopting a non-optimal policy regime (the
ination-targeting regime) as opposed to the optimal policy regime (the Ramsey regime). Some-
what abusing notation, we again use  X to denote the non-stochastic steady state under the
Ramsey regime. As it turns out, the steady-state ination rate under the Ramsey regime is
zero. Therefore,  X is also the non-stochastic steady state associated with the ination-targeting
regime. Suppose that the economy is at the steady state  X prior to date 0. Then the welfare
cost of the ination-targeting regime, inf, is given as
inf = 1  

V (  X;z;inf)
V (  X;z;ram)
 1
1 c
where V (  X;z;inf) and V (  X;z;ram) are the lifetime utility associated with the ination-
targeting and Ramsey regimes, respectively.
3.2.1 The case with permanent productivity shock
Let us rst look at the case where the aggregate productivity level zt follows the process given
by (36) and the variance of idiosyncratic shocks follows the process given by (40). Then how do
cyclical uctuations in ;t aect the economy? Recall that, given our aggregation result, the
idiosyncratic risk aects the aggregate dynamics through its eect on t, and hence, through
its eect on the eective discount factor, ~ t;t+1, which is dened in (26). When the processes
for zt and ;t are given, respectively, by (36) and (40), the eective discount factor becomes
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Since z;t+1 is i.i.d. and standard normal, the eective discount factor in this case is also i.i.d.
and it is log-normal:









Thus, under the specication given by (36) and (40), the eect of cyclical idiosyncratic risk is
to make the eective discount factor an i.i.d. random variable with the distribution given by
(43).
Table 1 shows the welfare cost of business cycles, bc, for c = 0:7;2 and for b = 0; 0:8.
When the risk aversion is relatively low, c = 0:7, the welfare cost of business cycles is negative,
that is, the expected utility is higher when z > 0 than when z = 0. This result is consistent
with the nding by Cho and Cooley (2005).7 Furthermore, in this case, making the idiosyncratic
risk countercyclical decreases the welfare cost of business cycles (that is, it increases the welfare
gain of business cycles). On the other hand, when the relative risk aversion is higher, c = 2,
the welfare cost of business cycles is positive and is magnied by cyclical uctuations in ;t.
Indeed, when c = 2 and b =  0:8, the welfare cost of business cycles is about 7.3 percent of
consumption, which is a sizable amount.
Figures 1-4 show impulse response functions to a one-standard deviation shock to the pro-
ductivity growth under the policy regimes and for c = 0:7;2 and b = 0; 0:8. These gures
show that, regardless of the policy regime, changing b does not aect the impulse response
functions. In other words, changing ~ t;t+1 from a constant to an i.i.d. random variable does
not change the impulse response functions. In addition, for each value of c and b, the impulse
response functions are the same between the two policy regimes.
Turning back to Table 1, we see that the welfare cost of adopting the ination-targeting
regime is negligible for all values of c and b considered here. Even when c = 2 and b =  0:8,
it is only 0.0006 percent (recall that the welfare cost of business cycles is 7.3 percent for that
case). Thus we conclude that, under permanent productivity shocks, cyclical uctuations in
the idiosyncratic risk do not aect how the monetary policy should be conducted, even if it
makes the welfare cost of business cycles very large.
3.2.2 The case with temporary productivity shock
Now consider the case where the productivity shock follows the process given by (38), and the
variance of idiosyncratic shocks follows the process given by (41). This specication diers
from the specication in the previous subsection in two important ways. First, the productivity
process (38) is stationary. Second, since lnzt is autocorrelated, so is ;t. This introduces
7Note that our welfare measure is conditional on the initial state variable. It turns out that the unconditional
welfare cost of business cycles is positive for c = 0:7.
16predictable variability to the idiosyncratic risk, and thus, to the eective discount factor, which
was i.i.d. in the previous subsection. Specically, the eective discount factor is now given by




Its conditional expectation then becomes










which uctuates over time. Indeed, when c < 1 and b < 0, the productivity shock today
increases zt as well as the expected value of the eective discount factor, Et[ln ~ t;t+1]. On the
other hand, when c > 1 and b < 0, the shock increasing zt decreases Et[ln ~ t;t+1].
Table 2 shows the welfare costs of business cycles, bc, for c = 0:7;2 and for b = 0; 0:8.
As opposed to the case of permanent shocks in the previous subsection, when b = 0, bc is
negative for the both values of c. In addition, its absolute value is much smaller. As in the
permanent-shock case, countercyclical idiosyncratic risk increases the welfare gain of business
cycles for c = 0:7, and magnies the welfare cost of business cycles when c = 2. When c = 2
and b =  0:8, the welfare cost of business cycles is sizable (12.2 percent), even though the
productivity process is stationary.
Figures 5-8 show impulse response functions to a one-standard deviation shock. In contrast
to the previous subsection, now the impulse response functions under b = 0 and b =  0:8
dier signicantly. When c < 1, countercyclical idiosyncratic risk tends to magnify the eect
of a productivity shock: the responses of output, investment, and labor are all greater when
b =  0:8 than when b = 0. This is because when c < 1, a current productivity increase
tends to increase the discount factor between the current and the next periods, which tends
to increase the investment demand and the labor supply. The opposite would happen when
c > 1, where a productivity increase in the current period tends to reduce the eective discount
factor between the current and the next periods, which tends to lower investment and labor
supply. Thus, now the cyclicality of the idiosyncratic risk aects how the aggregate economy
responds to a productivity shock. But, as these gures show, again, the dierence in the impulse
response functions between the two policy regimes is minimal. And as Table 2, the dierence
is negligible from the viewpoint of welfare. The welfare cost of adopting the ination-targeting
regime remains to be very small: inf is merely 0.0024 percent for c = 2 and b =  0:8, even
though bc = 12:2 percent in that case.
To summarize, with countercyclical idiosyncratic shocks, the welfare cost of business cycles
can be sizable, and also, it may amplify or dampen the responses of the aggregate variables to
a productivity shock, depending on the value of c (inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution of consumption). However, it does not aect how monetary policy should be
conducted. Even with countercyclical idiosyncratic shocks, the optimal monetary policy is
essentially given by the one that keeps the ination rate at zero.
174 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a New Keynesian model with uninsured idiosyncratic income
shocks, and analyzed the optimal monetary policy. We are particularly interested in the case
where the variance of idiosyncratic income shocks uctuate countercyclically over time. Our
calibration exercise shows that, although the existence of such idiosyncratic income shocks
implies a large welfare cost of business cycles, it does not aect much how monetary policy
should be conducted. Specically, the optimal monetary policy remains to be very close to the
complete price-level stabilization even in the presence of countercyclical idiosyncratic shocks.
Note that our assumption that idiosyncratic shocks hit both labor and capital income tends
to overemphasize the eect of idiosyncratic shocks. In a model where idiosyncratic shocks only
aect the labor income, the optimal conduct of monetary policy would be even less aected by
the presence of countercyclical idiosyncratic risk.
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19c 0.7 0.7 2 2
b 0 -0.8 0 -0.8
bc (%) -0.8191 -1.2983 2.0938 7.3301
inf (%) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0006
Table 1: Welfare measures with permanent technology shocks
c 0.7 0.7 2 2
b 0 -0.8 0 -0.8
bc (%) -0.0171 -0.6191 -0.0073 12.2258
inf (%) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0024
Table 2: Welfare measures with temporary technology shocks



















































Figure 1: Impulse responses to a permanent productivity shock when c = 0:7 and b = 0. Solid
lines = Ramsey policy; dashed lines = ination targeting.



















































Figure 2: Impulse responses to a permanent productivity shock when c = 0:7 and b =  0:8.
Solid lines = Ramsey policy; dashed lines = ination targeting.

























































Figure 3: Impulse responses to a permanent productivity shock when c = 2 and b = 0. Solid
lines = Ramsey policy; dashed lines = ination targeting.

























































Figure 4: Impulse responses to a permanent productivity shock when c = 2 and b =  0:8.
Solid lines = Ramsey policy; dashed lines = ination targeting.














































Figure 5: Impulse responses to a temporary productivity shock when c = 0:7 and b = 0. Solid
lines = Ramsey policy; dashed lines = ination targeting.











































Figure 6: Impulse responses to a temporary productivity shock when c = 0:7 and b =  0:8.
Solid lines = Ramsey policy; dashed lines = ination targeting.





















































Figure 7: Impulse responses to a temporary productivity shock when c = 2 and b = 0. Solid
lines = Ramsey policy; dashed lines = ination targeting.
















































Figure 8: Impulse responses to a temporary productivity shock when c = 2 and b =  0:8.
Solid lines = Ramsey policy; dashed lines = ination targeting.
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